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Prior research suggests that the pandemic coronavirus pushes all the “hot spots” for risk
perceptions, yet both governments and populations have varied in their responses. As
the economic impacts of the pandemic have become salient, governments have begun
to slash their budgets for mitigating other global risks, including climate change, likely
imposing increased future costs from those risks. Risk analysts have long argued that
global environmental and health risks are inseparable at some level, and must ultimately
be managed systemically, to effectively increase safety and welfare. In contrast, it has
been suggested that we have worry budgets, in which one risk crowds out another. “In
the wild,” our problem-solving strategies are often lexicographic; we seek and assess
potential solutions one at a time, even one attribute at a time, rather than conducting
integrated risk assessments. In a U.S. national survey experiment in which participants
were randomly assigned to coronavirus or climate change surveys (N = 3203) we
assess risk perceptions, and whether risk perception “hot spots” are driving policy
preferences, within and across these global risks. Striking parallels emerge between
the two. Both risks are perceived as highly threatening, inequitably distributed, and
not particularly controllable. People see themselves as somewhat informed about both
risks and have moral concerns about both. In contrast, climate change is seen as
better understood by science than is pandemic coronavirus. Further, individuals think
they can contribute more to slowing or stopping pandemic coronavirus than climate
change, and have a greater moral responsibility to do so. Survey assignment influences
policy preferences, with higher support for policies to control pandemic coronavirus
in pandemic coronavirus surveys, and higher support for policies to control climate
change risks in climate change surveys. Across all surveys, age groups, and policies
to control either climate change or pandemic coronavirus risks, support is highest for
funding research on vaccines against pandemic diseases, which is the only policy that
achieves majority support in both surveys. Findings bolster both the finite worry budget
hypothesis and the hypothesis that supporters of policies to confront one threat are
disproportionately likely also to support policies to confront the other threat.
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INTRODUCTION
Rarely has humanity faced two powerful environmental threats to
global well-being simultaneously. For decades scholars have been
studying how people perceive climate change and what they are
doing, would do, and want their governments to do to address the
threat posed by climate change to themselves as individuals, to
their nations, and to global well-being (e.g., Fischhoff and Furby,
1983; Löfstedt, 1991; O’Connor et al., 1999; Böhm and Pfister,
2001; Leiserowitz, 2005; Bostrom et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2015).
With the emergence of the pandemic coronavirus at the close of
2019, scholars are asking how people are protecting themselves
and what they want their governments to do to address the
threat posed by pandemic coronavirus. Both lines of research are
providing useful information on the political, psychological, and
social determinants of attitudes toward these risks. Little research,
however, compares the two threats in the public mind or looks
at how the presence of a second potentially calamitous threat
influences attitudes toward the other threat.
This paper reports results from an April 2020 survey of 3,203
respondents in the United States to identify the fundamental
similarities and differences in how the public understands these
threats and how these views of the nature of the threat influence
the level of concern and willingness to act in the public interest.
Policy preferences flow from levels of dread (Fischhoff et al.,
1978), but also from efficacy judgments (both for personal
actions and government policies; Bostrom et al., 2019) and moral
responsibility assessments (Doran et al., 2019).
The presence of two powerful threats at the same time may
influence what people are willing to support differently than if
there were only one threat. One logical hypothesis is that people
who are deeply concerned about addressing either climate change
or the coronavirus pandemic are part of a cultural community
that is likely to view the threat as systemic and needing a
coherent institutional response. The idea is that people who
demand a strong governmental response to the coronavirus
pandemic threat are more likely also to demand a strong
governmental response to the threat from climate change (and
vice-versa) because they understand that these sorts of threats
require a strong governmental response. There is a “crowding-
in” phenomenon by which recognition that one of the threats
needs a strong centralized policy response makes an individual
more likely to perceive that the other threat also needs a strong
centralized policy response. In contrast, to “crowding-in” that
leads to systemic thinking in general and recognition that the
world and national communities must act, there is a “crowding-
out” hypothesis that argues that people have a “worry budget”
so that great concern for one threat reduces concern for and
willingness to confront the other threat (Linville and Fischer,
1991; Weber, 2006; Huh et al., 2016). The idea is that people
can devote only so much energy to caring about and addressing
problems, so that the increase in concern for pandemics would
limit concern for climate change (and vice versa).
In summary, after describing the materials, procedures and
methods of data acquisition and treatment, this paper compares
the psychometrics for each threat, identifies the determinants
of support for policies to address the threat, assesses the finite
pool of worry thesis, and concludes with a discussion of the
significance of the findings.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Sampling Procedure
The study is a paywall-intercept (also called “survey wall”) survey
experiment conducted in the United States through Google
Surveys publisher network, to achieve a representative sample
of internet users. Google Surveys samples tens of millions of
internet users daily using a “river sampling” or “web intercept”
sampling approach, through a network of publishers on over
1,500+ sites publishing a variety of content, including 74%
News, 5% Reference, 4% Arts and Entertainment, and 17% other
(McDonald et al., 2012; Sostek and Slatkin, 2018). Google Surveys
pays these publishers. Surveys are kept extremely short, up to a
maximum of 10 questions, with formats restricted to minimize
response burdens. All responses are anonymous. The surveys are
offered by publishers to internet users, who can choose to pay for
accessing the publisher’s content instead of answering questions,
or can skip the survey. Internet users are selected through a
computer-algorithm-driven stratified-sampling process to create
an internet-user sample that matches the national internet-using
population age, gender and location. Users cannot opt into
surveys; they are assigned a random survey from those available
(Keeter and Christian, 2012). For paywall intercept surveys run
on the Google survey platform in the first half of 2018, the
response rate was 25% (Sostek and Slatkin, 2018). Although
Google Surveys publisher network does not offer a population
random sample, comparative analyses have concluded that it
provides a sample of adult internet users that is as representative
as others available, appropriate and sufficiently accurate for
survey experiments (Keeter and Christian, 2012; McDonald et al.,
2012; Santoso et al., 2016), and that the platform is useful given its
affordability and ease of survey implementation (e.g., Tanenbaum
et al., 2013). In comparative studies Google Surveys samples
have been found to be highly representative of the internet-user
population in the United States, for example including more
conservatives (40%) than a Pew Research survey sample (36%)
(Keeter and Christian, 2012, p. 9).
The study was reviewed by the University of Washington
Human Subjects Division and determined to be exempt from
federal human subjects regulations (IRB ID STUDY00009946).
Data collection took place in mid-April 2020 (April 12–17, 2020).
Participants
A total of N = 3203 U.S. adults completed all 10 questions in
the survey block they were offered (see below), out of 4,570
who answered the first question. The drop-off rate (after the first
question) was 29.3% on average for the pandemic survey blocks,
and 30.5% on average for the climate survey blocks. Age and
gender were inferred by Google; for the 818 participants who had
opted out in the Ads setting (which applies to Google survey as
well) age and gender are unknown. The estimated distribution
across the age categories 18–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, 65+
years was 243, 371, 422, 383, 478, and 488, respectively. Gender
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was not inferred for 714 participants; 1,295 participants identified
as female, 1,194 as male. For the publisher network samples,
Google estimates response biases for each survey, comparing age,
gender, and region to provide weights for a representative sample,
and reports the bias in the sample as Root Mean Square Error
estimated across these characteristics, for each question. RMSE
varied from 2 to 4.4% for questions in our surveys. In general
our samples slightly overestimate those aged 55–64 and 65+,
and those living in the Midwestern U.S. Because weights are
not calculated for those opting out, weighted samples are much
smaller. Our sensitivity analyses comparing results on analyses
conducted with weighted versus unweighted data revealed no
noteworthy differences in results (e.g., differences in percentages
supporting policies between the weighted and unweighted data
were in the tenth of a percent range), for which reason we report
analyses using unweighted data.
Materials
The questionnaire consisted of measures on psychometric
judgments, policy preferences, and political orientation. Age and
gender were inferred for all participants by Google.
The total set of survey items included 15 psychometric risk
judgments adapted from prior risk perception research on what
is often referred to in risk research as the psychometric paradigm
(Slovic, 1987; Bostrom et al., 2012, 2020). Each item has a seven-
point rating scale with labeled endpoints. The psychometric
judgments tapped into the following facets of perceived risk:
threat and dread, known risk, morality, controllability and
efficacy, and human benefits. Depending on the experimental
condition (i.e., version of the survey), respondents provided
psychometric judgments with respect to either global climate
change or the pandemic coronavirus. Figure 1 and Table 1 list
the complete wording and response scale labels.
Preferences with regard to supporting or not supporting each
of six policies were posed to all participants in block D in a check-
all-that apply survey question (response order randomized, with
an explicit “None of the above” option presented last). Three
of these referred to policies regarding climate change, the other
three to policies addressing the coronavirus pandemic. For each
risk issue, we selected a policy that is popular (e.g., research on
renewable energy, to address climate change; Howe et al., 2015),
and a policy associated with some contention or disagreement
(e.g., funding research on solar radiation management to address
climate change). Figure 2 provides the exact wording for the six
policies and percentages supporting each of them.
Political orientation was measured with the prompt “Would
you describe yourself as” and a seven-point rating scale
with the verbal endpoint anchors “Extremely liberal” and
“Extremely conservative.”
Survey Procedures
In order to fit the constraints of Google’s survey platform, which
allows a maximum of 10 questions per survey, we implemented
a sparse matrix design which randomized respondents to one
of eight distinct blocks, four on pandemic coronavirus, four
on climate change. From the set of measures on psychometric
judgments and policy support, we grouped questions into four
distinct blocks of 10 questions each, with a few core questions
asked across all blocks, following existing guidance for sparse
matrix designs (e.g., Rhemtulla and Hancock, 2016). The order
of the questions varied by block, but each block was exactly the
same across the two risks (pandemic coronavirus and climate
change). The check-all-that-apply survey question about policy
preferences appeared only in block D and was presented as the
last question in that block. Participants were randomly assigned
to answer survey items from a single block.
Imputation
The sparse matrix survey design results in systematically missing
data as respondents could not answer the items that were
not included in their randomly assigned survey block. We
resolved this issue by using multiple imputation to construct
a complete dataset that could then be analyzed. In particular,
we constructed 100 imputed datasets using the Amelia package
in R (Honaker et al., 2019). The Amelia algorithm assumes
data are jointly multivariate normal, and uses a bootstrapped
Expectation-Maximization (EM)-algorithm to generate complete
datasets from the posterior distributions (Honaker and King,
2010). While the missing survey data contain dichotomous and
seven-point Likert items that do not match the assumption of
multivariate normality, research has shown that this imputation
method works nearly as well for handling these data types
as imputation methods that are more specialized but also less
robust (Kropko et al., 2014). We imputed missing data only
if they were missing due to the survey block randomization,
fulfilling the requirement that imputed data be missing at random
(Rubin, 1976).
The imputation procedure incorporated all survey data,
including all psychometric judgments, policy support, and
political orientation, as well as risk comparison questions
that asked respondents how more familiar risks compare to
management of coronavirus and climate change, respectively,
and a question asking participants to rate how similar managing
pandemic coronavirus is to managing climate change (or vice
versa, for the climate change survey). The imputation procedures
also included demographic information from Google, such as
gender, age category, and categorical geographic information.
Prior to imputation we centered all non-binary variables and
dichotomized respondents’ categorical geographic information
which we included in the imputation only if at least 10
respondents shared a particular location.
We used the mean variance-covariance matrix across all 100
imputations to conduct the principal components analysis (Van
Ginkel, 2010; Van Ginkel and Kroonenberg, 2014), and the
confirmatory factor analyses.
The regression analyses were estimated by bootstrapping each
regression model equally across all imputations and limiting the
regression to fit only the observations for which the dependent
variable is not imputed. We imputed age and gender data
for any respondents for which Google was unable to infer
this information. We included the imputed gender values in
the regression, but only included the non-imputed age due to
apparently poor quality of the imputed age values. Our results
reported in the following section are not sensitive to these
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FIGURE 1 | Average psychometric risk ratings from the raw data (no imputations included), by risk, with 95% confidence intervals for the means. Sample sizes vary
from 400 to 1,601 per mean, as seven of these survey questions were presented in only one block, one in two blocks, one in three, and six in all four blocks.
*Indicates that the item has been reverse coded for purposes of this figure, so that the response scale is in the direction indicated in parentheses; this way higher
numbers imply higher perceived risk consistently for all items.
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TABLE 1 | Psychometric judgments and factor models used in confirmatory factor analyses.
Assignment of variables to factors
No. Item Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Threat and dread
1 How serious a threat is < climate change/pandemic coronavirus > to humankind? (No Threat—Very serious threat) Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 1
3 How serious a threat is < climate change/pandemic coronavirus > to you personally? (No threat—Very serious
threat)
Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 1
4 How serious a threat is < climate change/pandemic coronavirus > to plants and animals? (No threat—Very serious
threat)
Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 1
7 How much does the idea of < climate change/pandemic coronavirus > fill you with dread? (Not at all
dreadful—Very dreadful)
Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 1
Morality
14 To what extent do you have moral concerns about < climate change/pandemic coronavirus > ? (No moral
concerns—Very strong moral concerns)
Factor 1 Factor 2
13 To what extent do you feel a moral responsibility to do something about < climate change/pandemic
coronavirus > ? (No moral responsibility—Very strong moral responsibility)
Factor 1 Factor 2
10 Are the risks and benefits of < climate change/pandemic coronavirus > equitably distributed among humans? (Very
inequitably distributed—Very equitably distributed)
Factor 1 Factor 2
Known risk
2 How well is < climate change/pandemic coronavirus > understood by science? (Not at all understood—Very well
understood)
Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 2
11 How well informed do you feel about < climate change/pandemic coronavirus > ? (Not informed at all—Very well
informed)
Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 2
12 How soon will the consequences of < climate change/pandemic coronavirus > be experienced? (Immediately—Far
in the future)
Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 2
Controllability and efficacy
6 To what extent are the consequences of < climate change/pandemic coronavirus > controllable? (Not at all
controllable—Completely controllable)
Factor 2 Factor 4
8 How easy is it for you personally to take action to slow or stop < climate change/pandemic coronavirus > ? (Very
hard—Very easy)
Factor 2 Factor 4
8B How much can you personally contribute to slowing or stopping < climate change/pandemic coronavirus > ? (Can
do nothing personally—Can do a great deal personally)
Factor 2 Factor 4
9 To what extent can governments slow or stop < climate change/pandemic coronavirus > ? (Not at all—Completely) Factor 2 Factor 4
Human benefits
5 How much do humans benefit from < climate change/pandemic coronavirus > ? (No benefit—Great benefit) Factor 2 Factor 4
Depending on their survey context condition, participants responded to either the climate change or the pandemic coronavirus version of each item. Endpoint labels of
response scales are given in parentheses. Models 1 and 2 use all psychometric items; Model 3 uses only seven of them.
FIGURE 2 | Between survey comparison of percentage of respondents selecting to support each category of research (N = 800, 400 per survey).
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choices. Nor are the results substantially different if we round the
ordinal categorical imputations or restrict the imputed data to the
initial data range.
RESULTS
We report the results in three sections. First, we report results
concerning the psychometric scales. A description of the profiles
of climate change and coronavirus pandemic on the psychometric
scales is followed by factor analyses that were undertaken in order
to inspect the correlational structure of the psychometric items.
The last two sections of the results then focus on testing the worry
budget versus crowding-in hypotheses more specifically. This is
first done by reporting regression analyses to account for policy
preferences then by analyzing the effects of the survey context
(climate change versus pandemic coronavirus) on perceived risk
and policy preferences.
Psychometric Judgments
Profiles of Climate Change and Pandemic
Coronavirus
Participants rated pandemic coronavirus as slightly more
dreadful and threatening to humankind and to themselves
personally than climate change, but far less threatening to plants
and animals, as might be expected (Figure 1). Despite feeling
almost equally well informed about both risks, participants
rated pandemic coronavirus as less understood by science than
climate change. They also judged it harder to take action and to
personally contribute to slowing or stopping climate change than
to pandemic coronavirus, and felt a greater moral responsibility
to do something about pandemic coronavirus. Nevertheless, they
reported similar levels of moral concerns across both risks.
Dimensional Structure of Psychometric
Judgments
In order to investigate the dimensional structure of the
psychometric judgments, we conducted principal component
and confirmatory factor analyses. For all factor analyses we used
the R statistical environment (R Core Team, 2020).
For comparative purposes, we started by following the
procedures introduced in risk research by the psychometric
paradigm in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Slovic, 1987), which entail
conducting exploratory principal component analyses (PCA)
with varimax rotation. We conducted these analyses separately
for each of the two risk issues pandemic coronavirus and climate
change. Based on the scree test and Kaiser criterion (Eigenvalue
of at least 1.0), we inspected the 2-, 3-, and 4-factor solutions. The
results turned out to be unsatisfactory. While the first factor could
generally be interpreted as a threat/dread and morality factor, the
other items did not form a clearly interpretable factor structure
and showed substantial cross-loadings. Also, in the case of climate
change, the known risk items did not form a separate factor, as has
been found previously in the psychometric literature, but instead
loaded on the first factor together with threat/dread and morality
(see online supplement for additional details).
We therefore proceeded by trying to identify a consistent
factor structure in a confirmatory rather than exploratory
manner. We derived three factor models from the literature (see
Table 1), two from empirical work by Bostrom et al. (2020),
who used a set of psychometric items almost identical to ours,
and one from the seminal work by Slovic and colleagues on the
psychometric paradigm (specifically, from Slovic, 1987).
Similar to our study, Bostrom et al. (2020) measured perceived
risk concerning climate change and pandemic influenza (within-
subjects, in contrast to our between-subjects design) on
psychometric items that correspond to 12 of our 15 items. They
report (a) a two-factor solution that they computed separately
for climate change and pandemic influenza and which replicated
across the two risks, and (b) a four-factor solution that was
computed analyzing both risks together. Models 1 and 2 (Table 1)
were specified according to Bostrom et al.’s two- and four-
factor solutions, respectively. These two models use all 15 items.
The three items that our questionnaire included in addition to
Bostrom et al.’s twelve items were allocated to the factor that
matched them conceptually.
A robust finding in the literature on the psychometric
paradigm is that two factors have emerged across various risk
domains and respondent populations: Dread Risk and Known
Risk. We specified Model 3 (Table 1) by selecting the marker
items of these two traditional factors from our items, resulting
in a two-factor model using seven of our items.
We estimated all models separately for pandemic coronavirus
and climate change, and with both orthogonal and correlated
factors. Table 2 shows the goodness-of-fit indices of the models
(two models could not be estimated, see note to Table 2). The
only model that approached acceptable fit measures was Model
3. For climate change, it could only be estimated with correlated
factors; for pandemic coronavirus, the fit is better with correlated
than with orthogonal factors. We therefore display loadings only
for Model 3 with correlated factors (see Table 3).
TABLE 2 | Goodness-of-Fit indicators of confirmatory factor analyses.
Model χ2 df χ2/df GFI RMSEA
Climate change (n = 1,601)
Model 1 (orthogonal) 4747.56*** 90 52.75 0.74 0.18
Model 1 (correlated) 2729.31*** 89 30.67 0.85 0.14
Model 2 (orthogonal) 7058.52*** 90 78.43 0.61 0.22
Model 3 (correlated) 443.60*** 13 34.12 0.95 0.14
Coronavirus pandemic (n = 1,602)
Model 1 (orthogonal) 2118.49*** 90 23.54 0.73 0.12
Model 1 (correlated) 1694.97*** 89 19.04 0.79 0.11
Model 2 (orthogonal) 3066.46*** 90 30.07 0.61 0.14
Model 2 (correlated) 1365.10*** 84 16.25 0.83 0.10
Model 3 (orthogonal) 287.50*** 14 20.54 0.92 0.11
Model 3 (correlated) 144.49*** 13 11.11 0.96 0.08
*** < 0.001. orthogonal: orthogonal factors. correlated: correlated factors. For
climate change, Model 2 with correlated factors and Model 3 with orthogonal
factors did not converge. Models 1 and 2 use all psychometric items; Model 3
uses only seven of them.
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TABLE 3 | Unstandardized loadings (standard errors) and standardized loadings for Model 3 (correlated) confirmatory factor analyses of climate change (n = 1,601) and
coronavirus pandemic (n = 1,602).
Climate change Coronavirus pandemic
Item Threat/Dread (Un)Known risk Threat/Dread (Un)Known risk
Unstandardized Standardized Unstandardized Standardized Unstandardized Standardized Unstandardized Standardized
Threat to humankind 1.00 (–) 0.93 (0.02) 1.00 (–) 0.85 (0.02)
Personal threat 0.97 (0.02) 0.91 (02) 1.09 (0.03) 0.87 (0.02)
Threat to animals, plants 1.02 (0.01) 0.94 (0.02) 0.79 (0.03) 0.61 (0.02)
Dread 0.92 (0.02) 0.83 (0.02) 0.94 (0.03) 0.73 (0.02)
Understood by science 1.00 (–) −0.96 (0.03) 1.00 (–) 0.65 (0.04)
Well informed 0.41 (0.03) −0.46 (0.03) 1.13 (0.10) 0.73 (0.04)
Delay of consequences −0.31 (0.03) 0.29 (0.03) 0.50 (0.06) 0.26 (0.03)
See Table 1 for complete item wording. Dashes (–) indicate that standard error was not estimated. GFI = 0.95 (climate change), 0.96 (coronavirus pandemic); RMSE = 0.14
(climate change), 0.08 (coronavirus pandemic). χ2(13) = 443.60, p < 0.001 for climate change; χ2(13) = 144.49, p < 0.001 for coronavirus pandemic. The correlation
between Threat/Dread and Known Risk latent variables is −0.78 for climate change and.39 for coronavirus pandemic.
In sum, we find supportive evidence for the two traditional
psychometric factors: Dread and Known Risk in their pure form,
that is, using only marker items for each of these two factors. For
the remaining items, we could not identify a consistent factorial
structure. For Model 3 the structure of the Known Risk factor
differs for climate change and pandemic coronavirus (Table 3).
For climate change, the loadings of the extent to which the
risk issue is understood by science and of how well informed
the respondent feels, on the one hand, and of how delayed
the consequences are perceived to be, on the other hand, have
different signs. That is, respondents believe that the risk issue is
less understood by science and feel less informed themselves the
more delayed they perceive the consequences of climate change
to be. For pandemic coronavirus, in contrast, the loadings of
these three items on the Known Risk factor have the same sign.
Hence, for pandemic coronavirus, respondents believe that the
risk issue is better understood by science and feel better informed
the more delayed the perceived consequences are. One potential
explanation of this difference may lie in the fact that climate
change and pandemic coronavirus differ in familiarity. Climate
change is by now an “old” risk and people may believe that science
knows a great deal about it. Temporal delay of consequences
may then be associated with greater uncertainty of predictions.
Pandemic coronavirus, in contrast, is a new risk that just emerged
a couple of months before our survey was administered. Albeit
with concerted and prolific research efforts, science had just
started to investigate the virus at the time of the survey. In such a
situation, people may regard delayed consequences as providing
the opportunity for science to accumulate more insights.
Predicting Policy Support
The numbers of policies supported by survey context and risk
type are reported in Table 4. Figure 2 shows the percentage of
each sample supporting each policy.
To examine whether risk perceptions as measured on
psychometric scales are associated with risk policy support,
we created additive scales corresponding to the factors we
hypothesized. Based on the factor analyses reported in section
“Dimensional structure of psychometric judgments,” we calculate
the average of four items to create a Threat scale (Cronbach’s
alpha 0.91): threat to humankind, personal threat, threat to plants
and animals, and dread. The Known Risk factor that emerged
from confirmatory factor analysis was not reliable by common
standards, for which reason we calculate the average of two
items (Cronbach’s alpha 0.62)–understood by science and well
informed–to represent this factor in the regression analyses.
Averaging the items measuring moral responsibility and moral
concerns produces a Moral scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.86.
Efficacy is measured with the average of four items (Cronbach’s
alpha 0.82): ease of personal action, personal contribution to
slowing or stopping the risk, the extent to which government can
slow or stop the risk, and the controllability of the risk.
Ordinal probit models predicting the number of policies
supported were estimated separately for each risk. Consistently
across both coronavirus and climate change risks, greater
perceived threat was associated with greater support for
government funding research on addressing pandemic disease
and climate change (Tables 5, 6 show the mean coefficients
estimated across 100 imputed datasets for Block D of each
risk, in which no dependent variable data are imputed). In the
climate change survey, both higher perceived threat and greater
TABLE 4 | Percentage of survey participants supporting none, 1, 2 or all 3
research policies*, for each risk and by risk survey.
















0 20.3 33.3 64.3 41
1 26 21.5 16.8 28.2
2 15.5 12.3 12.8 21
3 38.3 33 6.3 9.8
100 100 100 100
*Specific policies are itemized in Figure 2.
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TABLE 5 | Model to predict the number of coronavirus-related policies that a
respondent supports.
Mean 2.5th percentile 97.5th percentile
estimate
Threshold
[PandemicResearch = 0| 1] −0.803
[PandemicResearch = 1| 2] 0.002
[PandemicResearch = 2| 3] 0.421
Location
ThreatScale 0.201 0.097 0.307
KnownScale 0.054 −0.059 0.166
MoralScale 0.002 −0.098 0.106
EfficacyScale 0.008 −0.149 0.160
Conservative −0.034 −0.138 0.066
Female −0.092 −0.356 0.171
Age 0.055 −0.018 0.130
Age = Unknown 0.180 −0.103 0.466
Ordered Probit. Mean Log Likelihood = −507. Mean AIC = 1,036. Nagelkerke
pseudo-R2 = 0.11.
TABLE 6 | Model to predict the number of climate change policies that a
respondent supports.
Mean estimate 2.5th percentile 97.5th percentile
Threshold
[ClimateResearch = 0| 1] 0.005
[ClimateResearch = 1| 2] 0.953
[ClimateResearch = 2| 3] 1.926
Location
Threat Scale 0.230 0.081 0.374
KnownScale 0.061 −0.063 0.187
MoralScale 0.131 −0.027 0.297
EfficacyScale −0.054 −0.239 0.120
Conservative −0.008 −0.117 0.095
Female 0.100 −0.193 0.403
Age 0.002 −0.08 0.082
Age = Unknown 0.184 −0.099 0.457
Ordered Probit. Mean Log Likelihood = −439. Mean AIC = 899. Nagelkerke
pseudo-R2 = 0.30.
moral concerns correlate with supporting more investments in
government funding for research to address climate change,
controlling for all else. Although the estimated mean coefficient
for the Moral scale does not quite rise to standard levels
of significance, the coefficient magnitude is relatively large
compared to other coefficients in the model.
For the two most popular policies, research on vaccines and
research on renewable energy, binary probit regressions were
also estimated for each of the 100 imputed datasets for each
risk, restricted to Block D. Here again, perceived Threat from
pandemic coronavirus is positively associated with being more
likely to support research on vaccines for pandemic diseases,
and perceived Threat from climate change is positively associated
with favoring government support for research on renewable
energy (Tables 7, 8).
TABLE 7 | Binary probit regression predicting support for vaccines.
Mean estimate 2.5th percentile 97.5th percentile
ThreatScale 0.251 0.130 0.379
KnownScale 0.104 −0.024 0.236
MoralScale 0.000 −0.126 0.128
EfficacyScale −0.061 −0.254 0.129
Conservative −0.034 −0.158 0.092
Female −0.062 −0.380 0.247
Age 0.013 −0.076 0.103
Age = Unknown 0.059 −0.266 0.389
Constant 0.297 0.069 0.537
Dependent variable: “Which of the following types of research do you think
governments should fund now with tax dollars? Research to. . . make vaccines
against pandemic diseases” (1 = Yes, 0 = No, N = 400). Mean Log
Likelihood = −240, Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 = 0.11. Bootstrapped confidence
intervals.
TABLE 8 | Binary probit regression predicting support for renewable energy.
Mean estimate 2.5th percentile 97.5th percentile
ThreatScale 0.173 0.004 0.347
KnownScale 0.085 −0.059 0.232
MoralScale 0.163 −0.018 0.352
EfficacyScale −0.050 −0.277 0.168
Conservative −0.010 −0.139 0.116
Female 0.076 −0.289 0.440
Age 0.057 −0.039 0.153
Age = Unknown 0.161 −0.175 0.508
Constant −0.242 −0.537 0.036
Dependent variable: “Which of the following types of research do you think
governments should fund now with tax dollars? Research to. . . make renewable
energy cheaper and better (1 = Yes, 0 = No, N = 400). Mean Log Likelihood =−223,
Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 = 0.23. Bootstrapped confidence intervals
Effects of Survey Context
Policy preferences are stronger within a same-topic context; in
other words, the average number of pandemic disease mitigation
research policies supported in the pandemic coronavirus survey
is higher than the average number of pandemic disease mitigation
policies supported in the climate change survey. Similarly, the
average number of climate change policies supported in the
climate change survey is higher than the average number of
climate change policies supported in the pandemic coronavirus
survey context. Additionally, overall, respondents support more
research funded by tax dollars to address pandemic diseases
than they do to address climate change, controlling for political
orientation (Tables 4, 9). These results support a “worry budget”
narrative, although support for research on risk mitigation of
pandemic diseases does not completely crowd out support for
research on approaches to reducing the risks of climate change.
In fact, the number of policies supported for research to mitigate
the risks of pandemic diseases is positively correlated with the
number of policies supported for research to mitigate the risks
of climate change (r = 0.407, p < 0.001 partial correlation,
controlling for political orientation).
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TABLE 9 | One-way ANCOVA of the survey context effect and differences
between risks, controlling for political orientation.
95% confidence interval
for mean
N Mean number of
policies supported
Lower bound Upper bound
Pandemic research
Pandemic survey 400 1.72 1.60 1.83
Climate survey 400 1.45 1.33 1.57
Total 800 1.58 1.50 1.67
Climate research
Pandemic survey 400 0.61 0.52 0.70
Climate survey 400 1.00 0.90 1.09
Total 800 0.80 0.73 0.87
Political orientation [F(2, 796) = 14.385, p < 0.001], mean difference between
survey types [F(2, 796) = 28.612, p < 0.001], between surveys for Pandemic
research, F(1, 797) = 14.492; between surveys for Climate Research F(1,
797) = 19.622, p < 0.001.
On average, respondents supported more than one policy for
each risk, with the exception that in the pandemic survey a
majority (64.3%) preferred that governments support none of the
three research approaches proposed to address climate change.
While it is possible that the solar radiation management and
carbon removal policies are more contentious than any of the
proposed research for pandemic diseases (on vaccines, tests, and
treatments), extensive polling has demonstrated recent strong
public support for renewable energy (Howe et al., 2015; Steentjes
et al., 2017), which was also one of the climate change mitigation
research policy options.
DISCUSSION
The psychometric risk perception profiles, including moral
concerns, for pandemic coronavirus and climate change
demonstrate that people see the two risks as similar in many
ways. Our results demonstrate that risk perceptions matter;
we find that threat and dread form a single dimension in the
exploratory factor analysis, as found in much previous work. The
extent to which individuals feel informed about the risk and to
which they see the risk as understood by science also correlate
positively. These two judgments clearly form one dimension.
Our confirmatory factor analysis shows that these two judgments
load together with the perceived immediacy of consequences
on a single factor. However, immediacy had a low loading and
was not a reliable component of an additive scale; for these
reasons only the first two items were used in the Known scale
as a predictor in our regression analyses. In sum, the role of
perceived immediacy of risk consequences in the dimension of
Known risks is less clear.
A robust result of the regression analyses is that perceived
threat is positively and consistently correlated with support
for government expenditures on research to reduce risk, for
both pandemic coronavirus and climate change, controlling for
judgments of efficacy, how well the risk is known, moral concerns
and responsibility, political orientation, and demographics.
The idea of the “finite pool of worry” or “worry budget” is
that people have limited cognitive capabilities (e.g., Achen and
Bartels, 2016), so the emergence of a new, potentially calamitous
concern such as pandemic coronavirus must necessarily lead
people to worry less about “old” concerns such as climate
change. A different view of the consequences of the emergence
of a new threat is that the new threat may actually increase
overall attention to communal threats as people understand that
responding effectively to both these threats requires systemic
thinking and cooperative actions at individual, organizational,
and national levels. In other words, learning about what needs
to be done to control the pandemic coronavirus has a spillover
effect of people learning that similarly climate change needs
enactment and implementation of new policies. Although we lack
the longitudinal data necessary to test these hypotheses, our data
definitively demonstrate that people are more likely to support
policies that address the threat about which they were encouraged
to focus than they are to support policies to address the other
threat. The data also show a significant relationship between
policy support for the two threats (i.e., people with higher levels
of support for policies to address the pandemic coronavirus are
more likely also to support policies to address climate change).
Perhaps our questions tap three different cognitive realities: a
finite pool of worry, acceptance that policy resources are finite,
and general support for policies to address communal threats.
How people link (or fail to link) their perceptions of the risks
from two potentially calamitous threats as well as preferences for
policies to address these threats seems to us worthy of extensive
further research. The concept of threat fatigue may be a useful
addition to future research designs.
A final note of caution regards the survey methods in this
study, and the potential threats to validity they pose. The short
survey format poses minimal burdens on respondents, and thus
is likely to have tapped into spontaneous reactions regarding
the risks investigated, pandemic coronavirus and climate change.
This can be seen as a positive, to the extent it mitigates response
biases, and reduces context biases that might be induced by
longer surveys. On the other hand, there is little deliberation, and
respondents may not have thought deeply before answering the
10 questions posed to them. To accommodate the short format
we implemented a sparse matrix design and used imputation
to fill in responses missing completely at random. Imputation
methods take full advantage of the information value of the
available raw data and are conducted only on responses missing
completely at random. Nevertheless, they are less informative
than actual responses would be and may underrepresent actual
response variability. Another caution is that while the survey is
likely representative of internet users in the United States, it is
not a true probability sample. Further, although the vast majority
of adults in the United States are now internet users, not all are.
It follows that the results may be subject to biases stemming
from the sampling and survey platform. Finally, we focus here
on risk perception in the United States, and these results are not
necessarily generalizable to other countries where culture and
political attitudes may differ.
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This survey provides an empirical snapshot of comparative
risk perceptions of pandemic coronavirus and climate change
in the initial months of the COVID-19 pandemic in the
United States, at a time when comparisons between risks from the
pandemic coronavirus and climate change had begun to attract
risk analysts’ attention (Bostrom et al., 2020). Further, the study
contributes to insights on worry budgets. While this study does
not provide within-individual comparative measures of perceived
threat, the psychometric results indicate that collectively climate
change is still perceived as a threat by the U.S. public, even
as the threat of pandemic coronavirus impinges on daily lives.
The manifest support for policies to address both pandemic
coronavirus and climate change demonstrates that immediate
contexts—both the overwhelming presence of the pandemic in
April 2020, as well as the immediate pandemic coronavirus
survey context—do not completely crowd out concerns about
and interests in addressing climate change.
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